Open defecation has remained a major concern in India since independence. Government of India from time to time through several policies and programmes has tried to increase the sanitation coverage. Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) is the prime programme focusing on making India open defecation free. Although progress has been observed but India still has a long way to go. The present paper studies the well acclaimed Midnapore model of sanitation, adopted by the Government as a role model of TSC. In doing so, the paper examines the factors behind the success of the model which during the process of replication were probably overlooked. The paper also tries to address some policy level problems in the implementation of the TSC. Thus, the paper brings out some aspects which may be relevant for policy makers to consider and make necessary changes to achieve the set target of 100 percent sanitation coverage.
Introduction
In 1988 only 4 percent of rural population in India had sanitation coverage. Since then the country made a long journey to achieve around 69.56 percent 1 rural sanitation coverage till date and vows to eradicate the problem of open defecation by 2012. Total Sanitation Campaign plays an important role in this path of progress.
Although figures of progress on sanitation appear to be quite impressive, the actual achievement to make India open defecation free has been slow and uneven.
Also the country still has a long way to go.
The first model to promote sanitation in the country was initiated by the Ramakr- behavioural changes among the masses which ensure that any improvement that takes place through the programme becomes sustainable. The method has been successful in countries like Bangladesh, Nepal and Nigeria 2 . In India too, as we will subsequently see in the paper, it has been reasonably successful to reduce cases of open defecation. Although, CLTS was officially introduced first in Bangladesh in the year 2000 3 one may argue that inception of such an idea can be traced in the Midnapore model itself.
Central Rural Sanitation Programme
The first national programme for rural sanitation, the Central Rural Sanitation 
Total Sanitation Campaign
In 1999 the CRSP was restructured into Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) with the goal of eradicating the practice of open defecation in the country by 2012. The strategy behind the programme, as stated, was that to make it a "demand driven" approach and "people centred" with "low to no subsidy" 5 . Only a nominal subsidy would be given as an incentive to the poor people belonging to the below poverty line (BPL) to construct household sanitary toilets if it is considered to be inevitable for full coverage of the community. Moreover this cash incentive would be given to the BPL families only after they complete the construction of the toilet and start using it 6 . The sanitary models that are eligible to receive a subsidy are basic low cost models and may cost Rs. 2500 or more. The incentive amount given from the TSC fund by both Central and State Governments will be Rs. 2200 7 . However, a state government, if wishes, may provide for more incentive from its own funds.
TSC, like CRSP also laid strong emphasis on Information, Education and Commu-5 The jargons like "demand driven", "people centred" and "low to no subsidy" are introduced in the documents of TSC. The intended interpretation of these jargons, as we understand, is to make the programme participatory and community led where local people would take the initiatives to create awareness about hygiene and sanitation and thereby demand for sanitary facilities in individual households and schools would be generated. The programme would follow a principle of "low to no subsidy" where a nominal subsidy in the form of incentive would be given only to the poorest of the poor households for construction of toilets. toilets are used for different purposes other than defecation 11 .
2 Locating TSC in the contemporary economic paradigm
The economics behind the strategy of the TSC, although projected as a tailor-made strategy for the programme, was not really specific to the programme itself. It is a part of the broader economic policy that is being pursued in this country. There has been a marked change in economic policies in the country since the economic liberalization taken place in early 1990s. Emphasis was given to let the market forces play a dominant role in all spheres of economic development. Role of the State over the years was reduced to a minimum. Limitations of a market economy was often overlooked and apathy towards all forms of subsidy was very apparent among the policy makers as it was believed to generate distortion and inefficiency in a market economy. Against this backdrop the Total Sanitation Campaign was launched and it is hardly surprising that the programme followed the principle of "low to no subsidy". The strength of CLTS methodology lies in behavioral changes among the masses through the communitys analysis of their sanitation profile and their awareness about the practices of defecation and its consequences.
In principle there is no conflict of interest between the CLTS methodology and a financial assistance policy. The principle of "low to no subsidy" therefore is neither necessary nor sufficient for implementation of a CLTS programme and has been incorporated in the TSC for fulfillment of an objective that is not related to CLTS methodology. In the first half of 1990s an idea developed among the policy makers that subsidy should be given only to the poorest of the poor people. Subsequently in the year 1997 Government introduced the BPL and APL cards for people below poverty line and above poverty line respectively. It was primarily introduced for distributing food to BPL and APL people at a differentiated rate through the public distribution system. Later the system was used for implementing other projects like TSC. A BPL card holder would get benefits like getting goods and services at a subsidized rate whereas APL card holders are more or less left to buy things 11 See GoI 2008.
at market price. It was assumed that APL people can afford to buy things from market.
Although, this innocuous looking system may appear sensible at the face value as it talks about targeting the poor so that they get the maximum benefit of subsidy, a closer look shows the danger inbuilt in it. The division of the entire population into BPL and APL categories has been done in a rather arbitrary way. The arbitrariness was manifested in two routes. First, the poverty line itself was not Since then both the districts have maintained their status.
Although, the programme remains as one of the biggest success stories and was cited all over the world, we believe that due attention has not been given to certain features of this model before trying to replicate it. These features were crucial to the success of the model and demands special attention.
The success of the Loksiksha Parisad model stands on three pillars, namely, i)
an excellent network system that connects the end user in the village with the programme implementation authorities, ii) a group of dedicated volunteers who worked at different tiers of the network to make the project a success and iii) maintenance of low cost sanitation hardware that made the system viable and affordable to the end user. We shall be arguing here that all these three strong points of the RKMLP model made it somewhat difficult to replicate; especially in an economic system that relies heavily on market ideology. Loksiksha Parisad being at the top of this network pyramid controls and monitors the activities taking place at different layers and nodes of the network.
Ramakrishna Mission Loksiksha
14 See RKMLP 2007.
The network that was put to work in the Midnapore district for implementing the Intensive Sanitation Programme was astonishing. As mentioned earlier the network had more to do than the sanitation project and was not built overnight.
It was the fruit of years of pursuit by the Ramakrishna Mission towards its goal of life enrichment of the people which they call 'development theology'. They are using this network to communicate and implement different ideas of the Mission at the village level for more than four decades. Such an excellent network helped the Loksiksha Parisad to run almost a parallel administration in the district so far as implementation of sanitation programs are concerned. The reach of such a network within a limited time span probably was unparallel in the country. Their understanding and grasp over the process was so robust that the government officials also sought the opinion or advice of RKMLP during their departmental meetings on implementation of sanitation projects. The RKMLP, however, was able to build such a network because of its religio-cultural activities. The long legacy of the Ramakrishnite ideas preached by the monks of the Mission forms the basis of its enormous influence and acceptance among the masses in Bengal.
Ramakrishna Mission is not like any other NGO; it is more than that. It is unlikely that a network system of this scale can be build by an NGO or a group of NGOs coming from outside for implementing some government project who otherwise has no business with the people in that area.
Next coming to the army of volunteers and staffs of RKMLP who physically constitute the network and keep it vibrant and functional, the dedication of the volunteers and administrative staffs is unmatched and does not seem to be linked with pecuniary incentives. Rather it can only be explained through the Ramakrishna Mission's philosophy of development theology. The entire group works as an organization of motivated people. They do it as if it is their duty towards people as a part of their religious praxis. Such dedication that comes out of religious motivation possibly cannot be generated through monetary incentives. In the present case the network already existed. The intention behind setting up and running such a huge network was to fetch returns for a larger purpose, namely to implement several religious, socio-economic and cultural development projects of the Ramakrishna Mission for the rural youth and underprivileged, and was not limited to the sanitation project itself. To establish such a network for the sanitation project through market mechanism (i.e., by paying regular wages to people for generating such network) and to make it perform desirably would require substantial investment and therefore is likely to increase the cost. If this cost is to be recovered from the end users of the project, as would be demanded by the market philosophy, then it would add to the price of sanitation. Again the production cost of the hardware is also likely to increase if workers are to be paid an officially approved minimum wage. This would again raise the price tag of the final product. Adding to this, the present model of promoting twin-pit-pour-flush latrines may be a good one to choose as a starter and may also help the rural people get habituated with a low cost sanitation system. However, there is a need to move towards more environment friendly technologies which would evidently increase the cost of sanitation.
For the success of a demand driven strategy it is essential that the people feel the need for the products and the need gets translated into demand. A commodity will be demanded only if people can afford it. Therefore, the translation of 'need' into 'demand' is not an automatic one. A mismatch between the affordability of people and the price of the product may severe the link between 'need' and 'demand'.
The projects like ISP are mainly targeted towards the rural poor who neither have consciousness towards hygiene nor have any means to afford it. The challenge is therefore twofold -first to make people feel the need and second, to create demand.
The IEC may generate awareness among these people and thereby generate the need for a hygienic sanitation system. But that does not guarantee the translation of those needs into demand. Habituating them with a low cost sanitation system may make them feel the need for a better sanitary system but the mismatch may remain. In a country where 77 percent of the population lives with an income less than Rs. 20 per day, people hardly can afford hygiene. It appears that in the RKMLP model this mismatch has been mitigated by cost suppression. If the cost of sanitation increases then such mismatches would surely dampen the momentum of the campaign and spoil the fruits that have been created by years of labour.
The mismatch can, however, be bridged by an extended government support. A suitably designed financial support system that can cover the increased cost and can include a larger population base under it would be the appropriate way to tackle the problem.
Conclusion
India lately has made considerable progress in its mission to eradicate open defecation. Although, there has been quite a spectacular rise in the area under sanitation coverage, the country still has a long way to go. Moreover there are cases of slip backs which could be as high as 20 percent. 2012 was set as a deadline to achieve 100 percent sanitation coverage under TSC and it is knocking at the door. In the paper we have tried to revisit the TSC programme and discussed that the most successful model would be somewhat difficult to be replicated throughout the country under the present policy regime. Therefore it is important that we address the issues mentioned in the paper and make suitable changes in the policy so as to make it replicable. Keeping these in mind it appears that the country needs a new fillip. The present policy may fall short in this respect and a new stimulus may be the need of the hour.
